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MEADE V. DENNISTONE: THE NAACP'S TEST CASE TO
"...SUE JIM CROW OUT OF MARYLAND WITH THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT"*
GARRETr POWER**
INTRODUCTION
In 1936, Edmond D. Meade, 1 the young African-American pastor
at Israel Baptist Church, contracted to buy the house at 2227 Barclay
Street in Baltimore, Maryland. 2 Estelle Dennistone and other neigh-
bors objected to the arrival of a "colored family" in the midst of their
almost exclusively white block.3 Suit was filed on their behalf by law-
yer William L. Marbury, Jr., in an effort to restrain Meade and his
family from occupying the premises.4
The row house at 2227 Barclay Street had been a rental property
in 1927 when the landlord had executed and duly recorded a cove-
nant promising that the house would not "at any time [be] occupied
or used by any ... negroes .... ,,5 But in 1935 after the house had
fallen vacant and had lapsed into terrible condition, the current own-
ers sold it to Frank Berman, who later contracted to sell it to Meade
* Juanita Jackson Mitchell in an oral interview in 1991, attributed this quotation to
Charles Houston, the NAACP's special counsel. See Bruce A. Thompson, The Civil Rights
Vanguard: The NAACP and the Black Community in Baltimore, 1931-1942, at 239 (1996)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with the University of
Maryland College Park McKeldin Library).
** Garrett Power is a Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of Law
with a special interest in property law and Baltimore History.
1. The court records in the case erroneously refer to Edmond Meade as "Edward [sic]
Meade." Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 296, 196 A. 330, 331 (1938); see also Tran-
script of Record at 1, Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 A. 330 (1938) (No. 26-Oct.
Term 1937) [hereinafter Meade Transcript]. Meade's obituary confirms that his first name
was correctly spelled "Edmond." See Rev. Meade Eulogized at Thurs. Services, BALTr. EvE. SUN,
Jan. 5, 1985 (on file at Enoch Pratt Free Library, Afro-American Vertical File) [hereinafter
Obituary].
2. See E.D. Meade, Was Pastor, Long Official of NAACP, AFRO-AM. LEDGER (Balt.), Jan. 3,
1995 (on file at Enoch Pratt Free Library, Afro-American Vertical File).
3. See Meade Transcript, supra note 1, at 5-6 (Statement of the Case) (noting that the
house at 2227 Barclay Street had never been occupied by non-Caucasians and that the
plaintiffs would suffer loss and injury by such an occupation).
4. See id. at 3-6 (Docket Entries and Statement of the Case).
5. Meade, 173 Md. at 297, 196 A. at 331 (describing the terms of the covenant).
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for $1100.6 Meade made a $150 down payment and, along with his
family, took possession.7
The neighbors requested an injunction, and Judge George A.
Solter of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City granted it.8 Meade and
his family were perpetually enjoined and restrained from using or oc-
cupying 2227 Barclay Street.' Likewise Berman was "perpetually en-joined and restrained from procuring, authorizing or permitting...
any Negro or Negroes or person or persons, either in whole or in part
of Negro or African descent" from using or occupying the premises.10
In 1938, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed Solter's order."1
Today Meade v. Dennistone remains as an ugly artifact of Balti-
more's, Maryland's, and the Nation's heritage of racial discrimination.
But it is also part of a larger story. The prologue is the timeless debate
concerning how free markets should be. The setting is a great Ameri-
can city in the throes of changes wrought by suburbanization. The
plot concerns a racist conspiracy; a subplot involves electoral politics
as Republicans and Democrats take turns seeking African-American
voters. And the conclusion is a beginning-the beginning of a "civil
rights movement" whereby The National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP) undertakes to exorcize racial dis-
crimination from American law.
Part I of this Article starts with the fundamental legal proposition
that property should be freely transferable from one person to an-
other. A legal strategy to restrain the freedom of alienation had to be
found before "exclusive" communities could be created. Part II traces
the evolution of residential racial segregation in Baltimore from de
jure to defacto. After public segregation ordinances were struck down
as unconstitutional, a new strategy emerged that relied on the en-
forcement of private covenants. Part III discusses Meade v. Dennistone,
wherein, despite the best efforts of the NAACP, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland legitimized residential racial restrictions. Part IV traces
the aftermath of the Meade decision, and the afterlife of the advocates
who argued it, during the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement.
6. Id. at 298, 196 A. at 331. The $1100 sales price is taken from the contract of sale
but it is misleading. See Meade Transcript, supra note 1, at 10. Consistent with a distinctive
practice common in Baltimore, the sale was "on leasehold," subject to annual ground rent
of $65. If the ground rent is capitalized at the customary 6%, its value is $1084 and the
sales price is equivalent to $2184 in freehold.
7. Meade, 173 Md. at 298, 196 A. at 331.
8. Meade Transcript, supra note 1, at 22-23 (Decree) (granting the injunction).
9. Id. at 22 (Decree).
10. Id. at 23 (Decree).
11. Meade, 173 Md. at 309, 196 A. at 336.
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And Part V chronicles the overruling of Meade as the United States
Supreme Court found a new willingness to attack racial discrimina-
tions both public and private. The essay then concludes with a rumi-
nation on how changing precedents, customs, and politics led to the
final judicial rejection of the "separate but equal" treatment of the
races.
I. FREEDOM OF ALIENATION
The right of transfer or "alienation" from one person to another
is the first principle of the property law system. This prerogative al-
lows the market to function efficiently by assuring that resources can
be sold for top dollar to the highest bidder.1 2 Alienability also pro-
motes individual autonomy by allowing the owners to freely rearrange
property rights so as to optimize their use and enjoyment."3
On the other hand, when property rights have been alienated
and divided among many owners, unsolvable conflicts may arise as to
how the resource will be utilized. 4 Division of ownership once ac-
complished may interfere with the best use, and thereby depress the
market value. 5 Moreover, restraints on alienation may deny some ac-
cess to the market on the basis of race, class, or other socially unac-
ceptable reasons.
Hence freedom of alienation promotes the free market in re-
sources and individual autonomy, but the results of alienation may
depress property values and deny individuals equality. Such is the
"alienation dilemma."' 6 And since time immemorial, it has fallen
upon the Anglo-American courts to determine when it is in the public
interest to promote alienability and when it is in the public interest to
prevent it.
Efforts by medieval dynasts to make their estates inalienable re-
sulted in "[o] ne of the great and continuing conflicts in the develop-
ment of English property law." 17 Feudal lands served as the wellspring
of power, status, and wealth.'" The great barons sought to aggrandize
their families by entailing their lands and passing their wealth intact
12. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 54 (5th ed. 2002) (noting that
transferability of property ensures that property moves from low value to high value uses).
13. JOSEPH W. SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 11 (2001).
14. Id.
15. See id. (noting that restrictions on alienation may prevent the sale of property as its
value rises).
16. Id. Singer refers to problems such as these as the "alienation dilemmas."
17. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at 215-16 (summarizing the development of
the fee tail).
18. Id. at 216.
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from the current generation to eldest male heir of the next.' 9 The
King resisted this entailment of property (and the resulting concentra-
tion of wealth) as a threat to his sovereign power and as an evasion of
his inheritance taxes.2" He convinced his courts to "bar the entail" so
as to make landed estates more freely transferable and taxable.2 The
land lords responded through Parliament with laws facilitating single-
file male descent.22 And the King's courts answered back by entertain-
ing collusive lawsuits that cut off the rights of issue.23 Not to be out-
done, lawyers for the dynastic gentry devised trust instruments with
novel provisos designed to keep the property in the family.24 So it has
gone for the last nine hundred years. Sometimes the courts have ac-
cepted restraints on alienation "if ... reasonable in purpose, effect,
and duration," and sometimes the courts have struck down such provi-
sions as "repugnant. 25
Contractual restraints on use and enjoyment of land can in effect
also limit its marketability. Although use and enjoyment constraints
are not literally restraints on alienation, they may nonetheless sup-
press demand and interfere with efficient utilization. The common
law's historic compromise was to permit landowners to contractually
restrict the use and enjoyment of their entitlements as between them-
selves, but to sharply curtail the extent to which restrictions could
"run with the land" and be binding on successors in title. 26 A basic
concern that perpetual restrictions could foreclose efficient land use
forever led the courts to this result.
In 1583, in the fabled Spencer's Case,27 the judges ruled that the
burden of a covenant would only be binding on successors when it
19. See id. (noting that the male heirs were viewed as the head of a family that extended
through various generations and property owners sought to ensure that future owners
would not be able to cut off their issue).
20. Id. at 216-17.
21. Id. at 217.
22. Id. at 216 (noting that Parliament established fee tail which allowed a property
owner to ensure that property descended to his lineal descendants until all of his descend-
ants were dead).
23. Id. at 217 (noting that a fee tail tenant in possession could "bar the entail" by ob-
taining a court decree that granted him a fee simple, which would cut off the rights of his
issue and eliminate any reversion or remainder).
24. Id. at 217 n.18 (noting that landowners created a "strict settlement" that allowedinalienability to continue based on the fact that only a tenant in possession could dis-
entail).
25. See id. at 227, 228.
26. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at 859-60 (noting that at common law,promises were not enforceable against persons who were not a party to the original transac-
tion unless there was privity of estate).
27. 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583).
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touched and concerned the land, and then only when there had been
a landlord-tenant relationship between the original parties when the
contract was entered into. 28 Absent such a tenurial relationship (cryp-
tically referred to as "privity of estate"), neighbors who reciprocally
agreed to covenants and conditions could not bind their successors in
tide.29 Developers who sold lots outright were precluded from impos-
ing uniform restrictions that would be enforceable against the original
promissor's heirs, successors, and assigns.3 °
At mid-nineteenth century, the English courts found themselves
still actively reconsidering the appropriate balance between promo-
tion of the marketability (by guaranteeing alienability) and the pro-
motion of autonomy (by allowing contractual restraints on the use
and enjoyment).31 The English Lord Chancellor shifted the balance
in 1848 in the landmark case of Tulk v. Moxhay.3 2 Therein a pur-
chaser of land had covenanted on behalf of himself and his successors
in title to keep Leicester Square open as a private garden for the en-
joyment of surrounding householders.3" When a subsequent pur-
chaser who had acquired Leicester Square with knowledge of the
covenant undertook to commercially develop it, the Equity Court
granted an injunction.34 In equity the covenants could run with the
land.3 The public policy in favor of free alienation of land yielded to
the equitable principle that in fairness and justice a purchaser with
notice ought to be subject to a solemn contract of which he was aware.
II. RACIAL RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
A. Suburbanization
When Tulk v. Moxhay was decided, English and American cities
were in the throes of change. Suburbs had bordered London since
28. Id. at 75.
29. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at 860 (noting that English courts found
that privity of estate was only satisfied by a landlord-tenant relationship).
30. See generally id. (noting that in England the burden of a covenant will not run be-
tween landowners at law).
31. See id. at 864, 867 (noting that although English courts had previously refused to
hold that negative servitudes could run against successive owners, the English courts in
1848 responded to market demands and provided that negative covenants could run
against subsequent owners in equity in certain circumstances).
32. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
33. Id. at 1143.
34. Id. at 1144-45.
35. Id. at 1144.
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the 1700s,36 and by the mid-nineteenth century they could be found
on the edge of a number of Anglo-American cities.3 v Urban historians
simply explain them as a result of unprecedented urban growth. 38
The pre-modern cities were unable to contain the explosive popula-
tion expansion. 39 A field of forces pushed and pulled the burgeoning
middle class out of the old urban centers and onto the outskirts. Re-
pulsion to slums, contagious disease, and factory smoke, combined
with prejudice against those of a different race, religion, or lower
class, and an attraction to living near to co-religionists and people of
an equal or higher caste, and the dream of a pastoral family life com-
bined to make "suburbia ... the residence of choice for the Anglo-
American middle class." 40
American suburban development followed the street car lines.4"
Speculators platted land bordering the ever-lengthening electric
street railway system into building lots and constructed row houses
that they then offered for sale. 42 The low-cost transit coupled with the
efficiencies of constructing block rows (shared walls, common utility
lines, and mass construction) brought houses within the means of
mechanics, artisans, and other skilled workers, as well as the middle
class.43
The Baltimore house at 2227 Barclay Street serves as an exem-
plar. In Baltimore, the preferred location for suburban development
was to the north beyond the town's North Avenue boundary. Access
to the northwest was obstructed by the Jones Falls stream valley, but
the northeast corridor was unobstructed and prime-ripe for develop-
36. ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA 25-26(1987) (noting that in the mid-eighteenth century, the merchant elite of London began to
move to agricultural settlements outside London).
37. Id. at 106 (stating that in the 1850s and 1860s the middle class in the United States
began to move to suburbs).
38. Id. at 19 (describing the development of the modern suburb in London).
39. Id. at 19-20.
40. Id. at xi.
41. Id. at 136 (noting that development in the suburbs followed the rail system); see also
SAM BASS WARNER, JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON, 1870-
1900, at 2-3 (2d ed. 1978) (explaining that the expanding settlements in Boston were made
possible by the railway transportation system).
42. FISHMAN, supra note 36, at 136 (stating that in the second half of the nineteenth
century, developers grasped the potential of streetcar lines for suburbanization); MARY EL-
LEN HAYWARD & CHARLES BELFOURE, THE BALTIMORE Row HOUSE 127 (1999) (noting that
EdwardJ. Gallagher, a developer of rowhouses in Baltimore, would not build in an area if
it was not served by a streetcar line).
43. HAwARD & BELFOURE, supra note 42, at 85, 105-06.
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ment. 4 A horse-drawn street railroad had run along York Road since
the 1860s,"5 and by 1892 a speculative builder had constructed eleven
houses in a block row along the east side of the 2200 hundred block of
Barclay Street (just one block from the York Road line)." The
builder offered No. 2227 Barclay Street for sale on leasehold subject
to a $65 annual ground rent.4 7 The lower down payment associated
with the ground rent system of finance (peculiar to Baltimore) tended
to make the houses more affordable.4"
Illustration 1. 2200 Block of Barclay Street. [From Mary Ellen
Hayward & Charles Belfoure, The Baltimore Rowhouse (1999). Used
by permission.]
Although the newcomers to the 2200 block of Barclay Street
found refuge from the smoke, squalor, disease, and filth of the old
city, the developer offered no assurance that these conditions might
44. JAQUES KELLY, FROM PEABODY HEIGHTS TO CHARLES VILLAGE: THE HISTORIC DEVEL-
OPMENT OF A BALTIMORE COMMUNITY 5 (1976).
45. Street Car System and Rapid Transit, in 1 BALTIMORE: ITS HISTORY AND ITS PEOPLE 
547
(Clayton Colman Hall ed., 1912).
46. HAYWARD & BELFOURE, supra note 42, at fig. 73.
47. See supra note 6 (discussing the concept of ground rent).
48. For a history and description of the ground rent system see HAYWARD & BELFOURE,
supra note 42, at 12-14; see also Garrett Power, Entail in Two Cities: A Comparative Study 
of
Long Term Leases in Birmingham, England and Baltimore, Maryland 1700-1900, 9 J. ARCHITEC-
TURE & PLAN. RES. 315, 315-24 (1992).
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not some day move to the suburbs. Just six blocks to the northwest of
Barclay Street, a large-scale subdivider had grander plans. The
Peabody Heights Company offered for sale "the most desirable lands
for the erection of FIRST CLASS RESIDENCES within the suburbs of
Baltimore."49 It looked to make its lands more attractive than those
offered by its competitors by imposing perpetual restrictions requiring
that all dwellings be "first class" and that slaughter houses, livery sta-
bles, manufactories, and saloons would be prohibited.5" The Com-
pany looked to Tulk v. Moxhay as the legal precedent that would allow
these covenants to run with the land and provide long-term guaran-
tees of the community's "first class" character.5"
Promoters had formed the Peabody Heights Company in 1870
and then acquired fifty acres of land bordered by 27th Street to the
south, 31st Street to the north, Maryland Avenue to the west, and
Guilford Avenue to the east, and bisected by St. Paul Street. 52 For a
decade the Jones Falls lay between the tract and the downtown, but by
the mid-1880s a slow paced horse-drawn streetcar line had bridged the
stream valley and their parcel seemed ripe for development.5 1
The Company targeted the city's middle-class elite as its clien-
tele.54 The restrictive covenants mandated that the twenty-odd blocks
be subdivided into building lots in a conventional gridiron plan of
rectangular lots, twenty-five feet wide, and suitable for stately town
house development.5 5 Construction would be set back twenty feet
from the street and ornamented with shrubbery and flowers. 56 The
Company retained a right of design approval over the houses that
were to be built in the classic urban row house style with three stories,
brownstone or glazed-brick facades, marble trim, large rooms, high
ceilings, oak doors, mahogany paneling, and brass fittings.57
Even after the St. Paul line was converted to a more rapid cable
car system in the 1890s, Peabody Heights lay largely vacant and unim-
49. KELLY, supra note 44, at 3.
50. Id. at 3, 6.
51. See Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co. of Baltimore, 70 Md. 493, 498, 17 A. 372(1889) (Peabody Heights Co. argued, based on Tulk, that once restrictions are established
they remain enforceable with subsequent owners).
52. KELLY, supra note 44, at 3, 6.
53. Id. at 5-6, 8.
54. See id. at 3-6 (discussing the Company's advertising of the neighborhood's proxim-
ity to estates of the city's elite, and the Company's awareness of the trend among middle-
class citizens to move out to the suburbs).
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1, 6, 11.
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proved.58 The Company seems to have misunderstood the taste of its
intended clients. When relocating beyond the city limits, the captains
of industry, merchant chiefs, and top professionals generally pre-
ferred picturesque villas on curving roads in park like settings, and
Baltimore's more modest middle-class home buyers could not afford
the wide lots and stately town houses mandated by the Peabody
Heights covenants.59 In the early 1890s, the Company's board of di-
rectors dubbed its earlier demands "absolute folly" and conjectured
that "but for these apparently harmless restrictions [the building lots]
would have been sold years ago."a°
When the Company went to court in an effort to get rid of the
dysfunctional restrictions, it found itself the captive of their aliena-
tion. Following the precedent of Tulk v. Moxhay, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland ruled that the covenants and conditions had been validly
created, and that they reciprocally benefited and burdened all lot
owners and their successors in tide who were on notice of them."
Because a number of lots had been sold, and some re-sold, the cove-
nants could only be modified with the unanimous consent of all of the
present owners.62 It was not until 1896 that a developer obtained the
consent of all interested parties and began construction of Peabody
Heights houses on a more modest scale.6 3
Two miles further to the northwest, another land speculation
firm, the Roland Park Company, had conceived an even grander strat-
egy for marketing building lots to the city's middle-class elite.64 Desig-
nation of its subdivision as a "park" suggested an aristocratic estate,
and the restrictive covenants held the promise of an "exdlusive" dis-
trict of picturesque cottages and garden villas.65
58. Id. at 9-10.
59. See KELLY, supra note 44, at 6 (describing how the Peabody Heights Co. used restric-
tions to ensure that the neighborhood would have stately mansions); see also HAYWARD &
BELFOURE, supra note 42, at 132 (asserting that some of the city's most expensive rowhouses
were in Peabody Heights).
60. See KELLY, supra note 44, at 10.
61. Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co. of Baltimore, 70 Md. 493, 501-03, 17 A. 372, 374-
75 (1889).
62. Id. at 502-03, 17 A. at 374.
63. KELLY, supra note 44, at 10-11.
64. See HAYWARD & BELFOURE, supra note 42, at 134-36 (describing the Roland Park
Company's various development projects).
65. See Wilbur Harvey Hunter, Baltimore Architecture in History, in A GuIDE To BALTIMORE
ARCHITECTURE 24-28 (John Dorsey & James D. Dilts eds., 1997) (describing how Bouton
used restrictive covenants to create an exclusive neighborhood).
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B. Racial Exclusion
By 1892, the Roland Park Company had acquired 550 acres of
restricted land intended for building lots.66 General manager, Ed-
ward H. Bouton, sought to determine exactly what type of restrictions
would make his building lots most attractive to first-class buyers.6 7
The deed covenants would certainly be " [c] arefully devised protective
restrictions safeguard[ing] owners from encroachment of business,
and from other uses of property detrimental to the values and general
good of the residential section."6 But what other restriction might
make the building lots more desirable? Perhaps in this era of height-
ened racial tension, a prohibition against Negro newcomers might ap-
peal to well-heeled whites.
The real prospect of African Americans buying building lots in
Roland Park was remote. Baltimore's 1890 population was roughly
435,000,69 and the black population was approximately 54,000, not all
of whom were homeowners.7 0 These bourgeois black families lived
clustered in the northwest section of downtown along upper Druid
Hill Avenue, just within the city's North Avenue boundary and adja-
cent to Mt. Royal (the old line white society district).7 1 But fear of "a
Negro invasion" was one reason why the white middle-class elite were
moving to the suburbs.7 2 Perhaps the promise that blacks would be
forever excluded would have a special market appeal.
In 1893, Bouton inquired of the Company's lawyers, Schmucker
& Whitelock, as to the legality of a provision prohibiting Negroes from
ownership or occupation. 73 The lawyers responded:
Schmucker & Whitelock
Attorneys and Counselors at Law
10 E. Lexington Street
66. HAvWARD & BELFOURE, supra note 42, at 134.
67. Id.
68. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUILDERS' EXCHANGES OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, BALTIMORE OF TODAY 96 (1916) (souvenir of the Fifth Annual Convention of the
National Association of Builders' Exchanges of the United States of America).
69. The Political and Human Geography of Baltimore City: An Overview 1729-1992, MARY-
LAND STATE ARCHIVES: DOCUMENTS FOR THE CLASSROOM (Maryland State Archives, Annapo-
lis, MD) Dec. 20, 1991, at 1.
70. HAYWARD & BELFOURE, supra note 42, at 125.
71. Cynthia Neverdon-Morton, Housing Patterns in Baltimore City, 1885-1953, in 16 THE
MARYLAND HISTORIAN 25, 25-26 (1985).
72. HAYWARD & BELFOURE, supra note 42, at 154.
73. Letter from law firm of Schmucker & Whitelock, to Edward H. Bouton, Gen. Mgr.,
Roland Park Co. (Oct. 5, 1892) (on file with Cornell University Libraries, Department of
Manuscripts and University Archives, Roland Park Co. Papers, #2828, Box 2-5) (stating that
Mr. Bouton asked Schmucker & Whitelock for an opinion).
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October 5, 1893
Edward H. Bouton Esq.,
Gen. Mangr. Roland Park Co.,
Baltimore, Maryland.
Dear Sir,
You have asked our opinion as to whether or not your Company can
legally insert a provision in deeds to purchasers of its lots of land at
Roland Park, that the title thereto shall at no time be conveyed to
negroes or persons of African descent, or be used or occupied by such
persons.
We have deferred writing you upon this subject until we could give to
it the time and consideration demanded alike by its novelty and its
importance to your Company.
Such a provision would not, in our opinion, be the mere imposition
of an easement, charge or restriction in the manner of the use of the
land to be sold by your Company, which would be valid against
parties purchasing the land with notice thereof as already deter-
mined by our Court of Appeals. (Newbold vs. Peabody Heights Co.
70 Md. 493; Halle vs. Newbold 69 Md. 265). It would rather be a
condition of partial inalienability annexed by the vendor of land in
fee-simple to prevent the transfer thereof to a class of persons because
deemed objectionable.
General restraints on the alienation of fee-simple property are void,
but it has been said by various writers that a grantee of such land
might be restrained from assigning it to a particular person or class.
The decisions of leading courts upon this subject are not uniform.
We are, however, of opinion that the weight of authority clearly sus-
tains the conclusion that even a restriction as to the persons or classes
of persons to whom the estate may be aliened is invalid.
This seems, moreover, to be the view of the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals, who in the recent case of Stansbury vs. Hubner (73 Md. 228)
in which we ourselves represented the appellee, quoted with approval
the proposition of Chancellor Kent, that conditions in conveyances
will not be sustained when they are repugnant to the nature of the
estate granted, or infringe upon the essential enjoyment and indepen-
dent rights of property, and tend manifestly to public inconvenience.
A condition annexed to a conveyance in fee, or by devise, that the
purchaser or devisee should not alien, is unlawful and void.
The difficulty of maintaining such a restriction would be greatly en-
hanced by the fact that the class intended to be excluded from interest
in the land is not a limited number of persons, but a whole race of
people, who are in Maryland numbered by thousands.
This embarrassment would also be further increased by the fact that
the race intended to be excluded is the African or colored race, who as
Justice Strong of the United States Supreme Court in the case of
2004]
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Strauser vs. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 103, says, were designed to be
assured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution the
enjoyment of all the civil rights that are enjoyed b[y] [sic] white per-
sons. While it is true that individual invasion of individual rights
is not the subject-matter of the Amendment (Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3) the significance of this constitutional provision is too great to
be overlooked in this connection.
The Supreme Court has declared the amendment to mean that all
persons shall be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and ac-
quire and enjoy property. (Barbier's case, 113 U.S. 27) and Con-
gress in a law sustained by that Court, (Ex parte Virginia 100 U.S.
313) has enacted that in every State all citizens shall have the same
right as is enjoyed by the white citizens thereof to inherit and
purchase real estate (Rev. Stat. U.S. Sec. 1978).
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the proposed provision in deeds
to be made by your Company would be illegal.
Yours respectfully,
/s/ Schmucker & Whitelock 4
Thus, the Company's lawyer opined that although private racial
restrictions were not unconstitutional under the United States Su-
preme Court's narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, the racial restrictions would consti-
tute an unreasonable restraint on alienation and were therefore
void.75 And in response Bouton dutifully included no racial covenant
in the Roland Park Company's first deeds.76
C. Disenfranchisement
Following the Civil War, American constitutional law underwent a
profound change. The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion abolished the institution of Negro slavery.77 African Americans
were persons, not property. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibited
denial of the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous con-
dition of servitude."7 8 And the Fourteenth Amendment ordered that
"all persons" (African Americans included) be guaranteed "equal pro-
tection of the laws."7 9
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Hunter, supra note 65, at 26 (enumerating the restrictions designed by Bouton
for Roland Park deeds, which did not include race restrictions).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment mandated a new public
policy, a question lingered as to its meaning. Did it forbid all racial
discrimination or only discrimination by public authority? In 1883,
the U.S. Supreme Court answered that the Fourteenth Amendment
only applied to public actions.8 ° Government discrimination was cur-
tailed, but not private discrimination. 8 Meanwhile in Maryland and
elsewhere there were renewed and revitalized efforts to disenfranchise
and segregate the Negro population.
Immediately after the Civil War, racism was not so virulent as it
was to become later. Racial prejudice abounded but after the initial
unease at seeing Negroes become the citizens and voters, Maryland's
dominant Democratic Party ignored them.8 2 Negroes freely partici-
opated in the electoral process and they voted Republican, but it did
not much matter to the Democrats." Between 1870 and 1895 the
Democratic Party won virtually all city-wide and state-wide offices.
84
The ruling Democratic coalition consisted of Southern sympa-
thizing patricians, nouveau riche businessmen, immigrant workers,
fledgling labor groups, and farmers.8 5 The Republican Party, which
consisted of Union loyalists, Old Wealth, western Marylanders, and
the newly enfranchised African Americans, 6 could claim only about
forty percent of the electorate.8 7
By the 1890s, the Democratic Party had fallen into disarray. Aris-
tocrats had left out of distaste for city boss Isaac Freeman Rasin and
his machine's election violence and abuse.8 8 Businessmen felt that
the Party was too solicitous of labor and farmers, who in turn blamed
the leadership for an economic downturn.8 9 Only in Baltimore City
was one faction still loyal. Boss Rasin kept the immigrant newcomers
in line with small favors and petty patronage. 90
At the 1895 election, the Republican Party took control of the
state house and General Assembly from the Democrats and, in Balti-
80. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883).
81. Id. at 11.
82. JAMES B. CROOKS, POLITICS & PROGRESS: THE RISE OF URBAN PROGRESSIVISM IN BALTI-
MORE 1895-1911, at 8.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 9-11.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 45.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 44-45.
90. See id. at 43 (stating that a portion of lower-class voters remained loyal to Rasin,
probably as a result of being under his control).
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more City, a Republican mayor was elected.9 1 Democrats looked for
ways to recapture their dominance. Although the Humpty-Dumpty
Democratic coalition could not be put back together again, simple
arithmetic suggested an alternative solution. The Democratic leader-
ship undertook to disenfranchise the state's approximately 60,000
adult male Negroes of voting age.92 Rather than rebuilding the Party,
the Democrats would make its comeback by disqualifying African
Americans from voting Republican.93
A strategy had been developed elsewhere that might deny Black
suffrage without running afoul of the Fifteenth Amendment. The
State of Mississippi had invented constitutional techniques for deny-
ing the black vote through the use of literacy tests.94 The Democratic
leadership looked to lawyerJohn Prentiss Poe to adapt this strategy for
use in Maryland.95
In 1899, Poe was serving as president of the Maryland Bar Associ-
ation.96 A lifelong Democrat, he had served as dean of the University
of Maryland School of Law since 1869."7 He was a lawyer's lawyer with
the respect of his peers and with expert technical skills.9 If anyone
could amend the organic law of Maryland to disenfranchise Negroes
without violating the Fifteenth Amendment it was John Prentiss Poe.
Poe drafted an amendment to the Maryland Constitution de-
signed to deny Negro suffrage.99 He proposed language containing a
"grandfather's clause" and a "reasonable explanation" provision.'00
The "grandfather's clause" automatically gave the vote to the lineal
male descendants of anyone eligible to vote on January 1, 1869. l0 l
This provision practically assured the right to vote to all white males
(other than newly arrived immigrants). 0 2 An alternative way of get-
ting the right to vote was to pass a test by giving the voting registrar a
91. Id. at 40.
92. Id. at 56.
93. Id. at 56-58.
94. See MARGARET LAW CALLCOTr, THE NEGRO IN MARYLAND POLITICS 1870-1912, at 115
(1969) (noting Southern states, including Mississippi, that had already adopted constitu-
tional amendments for the purpose of disenfranchisement).
95. CROOKS, supra note 82, at 58.
96. See Maryland State Archives, at http://www.mdarchives.state.md.us.
97. See id.
98. CROOKS, supra note 82, at 58.
99. CALLCOTr, supra note 94, at 115.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 115-16.
102. Id.
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"reasonable explanation" of a provision of the Maryland
Constitution.
1 0 3
From the Democratic leadership's point of view the advantage of
this amendment was its flexibility. The registrar's discretionary power
to determine what constituted a "reasonable explanation" might be
used in a racially discriminatory manner so as to disenfranchise liter-
ate black Republicans and to enfranchise illiterate immigrant
Democrats.° 4
The Democratic campaign in support of the disenfranchisement
of Negro voters appealed to both reformer and party regulars. Lawyer
and reformer, William L. Marbury Sr., a descendant of plantation aris-
tocracy, supported disenfranchisement because of his belief that
blacks were genetically incapable of assuming the responsibility of citi-
zens. 10 5 Less genteel Party regulars called the Negro vote "a perpetual
menace to the prosperity and peace of Maryland."10 6 And the notion
of a "Negro menace" so captured the white man's fancy that a number
of other racial segregation laws were passed by the General Assem-
bly.' 0 7 Public schools and prisons had always been segregated, but
new segregation laws extended this policy to railroads and steam ships
and other public accommodations. When a law requiring colored
passengers to occupy separate railroad coaches was challenged as a
denial of the "equal protection," the Court of Appeals of Maryland
upheld it under the authority of the United States Supreme Court's
recent 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson 1 8 that "separate but equal"
treatment satisfied the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 9
Efforts by the Democratic Party to amend the Maryland Constitu-
tion to deny suffrage to African Americans proved less successful. On
three occasions (1904, 1908, and 1910), the Maryland General Assem-
bly approved disenfranchisement amendments by the requisite three-
fifth majority, but in each instance they subsequently were rejected by
the voters in the required statewide referenda.110 The rejection of
these amendments by the voters, however, should not be seen as a
plebiscite in favor of equal rights and racial justice."' Republicans
103. Id. at 115.
104. Id.
105. WILLIAM L. MARBURY, THE CATBIRD SEAT 321 (1988).
106. CROOKS, supra note 82, at 56.
107. Id. at 56, 59.
108. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
109. Hart v. Maryland, 100 Md. 595, 614-15, 60 A. 457, 463 (1905).
110. CALLCO-r, supra note 94, at 118-32.
111. See id. at 119 (asserting that opposition to the amendments was not due to actual
disagreement about disfranchisement of blacks).
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and some reform Democrats joined blacks in opposing the amend-
ments out of concern that Negro disenfranchisement would entrench
the Democratic Machine. 12 And while Democratic city boss Isaac
Freeman Rasin ostensibly supported the amendments, it appears that
his machine, heavily dependent on the vote of first generation Ameri-
cans, took election days off.'1 3 It seemed too risky to make the right
of immigrants to vote Democratic dependent on the whim and ca-
price of a registrar.' 14
D. Segregation Ordinances
There was in Baltimore City, however, growing support for a par-
ticular form of racial segregation. In 1911, Baltimore's black popula-
tion numbered approximately 85,000, roughly 36,000 of whom lived
in the so-called Negro district that extended a quarter of a mile from
east to west and a mile from north to south on the northwest side of
town."' Houses in the downtown reaches of the district were over-
crowded, poorly ventilated, and lacked water and sewers.' 16 These tu-
berculosis ridden "lung blocks" were said to be Baltimore's worst
slum. 7 The uptown portion of the district was home to the 1000
families of the town's black bourgeois elite."' Their substantial three-
story town houses were intermixed with those of some white
residents." 9
Between 1903 and 1910, Baltimore's black population had grown
by approximately 600 families per year and the Negro District had
expanded. 20 White residents had resisted with terror tactics, but to
no avail as African-American families overflowed six or seven blocks to
the west. 12 ' But the eastern boundary remained inviolate. Houses to
112. See CROOKS, supra note 82, at 60-61.
113. See CALLCOTr, supra note 94, at 125 (noting while Rasin denied foregoing support
for the Poe amendment, Senator Gorman, a proponent of the amendment, was certain
that Rasin betrayed the cause).
114. CROOKS, supra note 82, at 61 (stating that opponents of the amendment called it
"clearly undemocratic" to allow unqualified election officials such power in applying the
"understanding" clause).
115. William George Paul, The Shadow of Equality: The Negro in Baltimore 1864-1911,
at 390-91 (1972) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin) (on file with the University
of Wisconsin).
116. Paul, supra note 115, at 392-93.
117. JANET KEMP, HOUSING CONDITIONS IN BALTIMORE 16-19, 38 (1907); Paul, supra note
115, at 394, 396; Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordi-
nances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REv. 289, 295-96 (1983).
118. Paul, supra note 115, at 391.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 389-90.
121. SHERRY OLSON, BALTIMORE: THE BUILDING OF AN AMERICAN CITY 279 (1980).
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the east of Druid Hill Avenue were in the exclusively white Mt. Royal
district, one of the most fashionable residential sections of Balti-
more. 12 2 No Negro residences had crossed the "color line."
In 1910, George W.F. McMechen purchased a house at 1834 Mc-
Culloh Street. 123 McMechen was a Yale law graduate and practicing
attorney. 2 ' He and his family would have been welcomed newcomers
except for the fact that they were black and they had crossed the color
line into the Mt. Royal society district.
121
The response was immediate. While the proletariat of west of the
Negro District in Baltimore had attempted to hold back the ex-
panding "black sea" with thrown stones and smeared tar, the pluto-
crats to the east in Mt. Royal answered with public meetings, petitions,
and legislation.12 6 Lawyer Milton Dashiell, a concerned resident,
drafted a segregation ordinance.
1 27
The segregation ordinance divided all of Baltimore into white
blocks and black blocks-no Negro could move into a block in which
more than half the residents were white; no white person could move
into a block in which more than half of the residents were Negroes.
128
The ordinance was crafted to satisfy the constitutional requirements
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
129
The "separate but equal" treatment of white residents and Negro re-
sidents was designed to satisfy the test of Plessy v. Ferguson.'3 °
The Baltimore City Council passed the segregation ordinance,
but when it proved to be politically, legally, and technically flawed, 3 '
its proponents sought a more skillful lawyer to do the re-draft. The
task fell to William L. Marbury, Sr., a resident of the Mt. Royal neigh-
borhood, whose credentials as a segregationist were well established
by his active role in the Disenfranchisement Movement, and whose
annual income of $40,000 made him one of the most successful law-
122. Power, supra note 117, at 298.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 298-300.
127. Id. at 299.
128. Id. at 299-300.
129. Id. at 300. Edgar Allan Poe, the City Solicitor, issued an opinion stating that the
ordinance was constitutional because it used the state's police power to separate whites and
blacks while keeping them equal. Id.
130. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
131. Power, supra note 117, at 301-03.
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yers in town. 13 2 Marbury redrafted the ordinance which after several
setbacks was upheld by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.1 3
E. The NAACP
The segregation ordinance served its immediate purpose of pro-
tecting the Mt. Royal district from a "Negro invasion. 134 And this
"Baltimore idea" for promoting residential segregation proved so at-
tractive that it was copied in a score of other southern and border
cities, Winston-Salem and Asheville, North Carolina; Richmond, Roa-
noke, and Norfolk, Virginia; Atlanta, Georgia; Birmingham, Alabama;
St. Louis, Missouri; and Louisville, Kentucky among them.13 5
Indeed the success of residential segregation ordinances was the
catalyst for the emergence of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People in 1909 as a nationwide counter-force
to segregation.
136
[I]ts membership and political power grew as it established
local branches to press court challenges to the segregation
ordinances. The success of these challenges varied: The
North Carolina Supreme Court had struck down an ordi-
nance as a violation of property rights; Georgia's Supreme
Court vacillated, first rejecting, then approving, different ver-
sions of Atlanta's ordinance; and the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals sustained its ordinances with some qualifications.'
It was from Louisville that the case testing the constitutionality of
segregation ordinances came to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1916.138
The ordinance in question was a close copy of the ordinance that
Milton Dashiell had originally drafted for Baltimore in 1910. After
hearing and rehearing the Court made fast work of it. In 1917, in the
unanimous decision of Buchanan v. Warley,139 the Court held that
while the ordinance under the precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson might be
said to afford "separate but equal" treatment to Negroes and whites, it
nonetheless violated the Fourteenth Amendment because:
The right which the ordinance annulled was the civil right of a white
man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a person of
132. Id. at 304-06; MARBURY, supra note 105, at 36-37.
133. State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 88 A. 546 (1913).
134. Power, supra note 117, at 306.
135. Id. at 310.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 310-11 (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 311-12.
139. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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color and of a colored person to make such disposition to a white
person. . . . We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the
property in question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise
of the police power of the State, and is in direct violation of the fun-
damental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion preventing state interference with property rights except by due
process of law. That being the case the ordinance cannot stand."'
The Court found that the ordinance was in violation, not of the
Fourteenth Amendment's "equal protection" clause, but of its "due
process" clause instead-the seller was deprived of the property right
to alienate his property.
Baltimore City Solicitor S.S. Field lamented the "modern ten-
dency to look upon property rights as more sacred than personal
rights,"' 41 (i.e. the property right of blacks to acquire and use property
free from racial discrimination, versus the personal right of whites to
discriminate on the basis of race). But the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land dutifully found the Baltimore ordinance "essentially alike in
theory and purpose" to the Louisville ordinance and therefore
unconstitutional.1
42
F. De facto Segregation
Baltimore's Mayor, James H. Preston, was undaunted. 143 He bor-
rowed from Chicago a plan to keep Negroes in their place. The Chi-
cago plan was designed to assure defacto segregation. 144 City building
inspectors and health department officials would cite for code viola-
tions those renting or selling to blacks in white neighborhoods. 145
Real estate boards would sanction as unethical those members who
violated the "color line."' 46 White property owners associations would
encourage their members to enter into reciprocal covenants preclud-
ing sale or rental to Negroes. 147 In essence de jure segregation was to
be replaced with a public-private conspiracy in restraint of sale or
rental to Negroes.
When Mayor Howard Jackson took office in 1923, he institution-
alized the city's segregation efforts with a committee. As his represen-
140. Id. at 81-82.
141. S.S. Field, The Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 5 VA. L. REv. 81, 81-84
(1917).
142. Jackson v. State, 132 Md. 311, 312, 130 A. 910 (1918).
143. Power, supra note 117, at 314.
144. Id. at 314-15.
145. Id. at 315.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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tative, he appointed his City Solicitor and good friend, Philip B.
Perlman. 4 Although only thirty-five years of age, Perlman already
had a substantial career of public service behind him. A member of
the Bar since 1911, he had been serving as Governor Albert C.
Ritchie's Secretary of State when he resigned to accept his post with
Jackson.' 49 While new to the game, Perlman could draw upon the
experience of long-time segregationist William L. Marbury, Sr., who
also was a member. 15° The Committee on Segregation undertook to
encourage neighbors, government officials, and real estate agents to
use restrictive covenants, peer pressure, harassment, and suasion to
promote defacto segregation. 151
The Committee for Segregation went to work at a tumultuous
time. Following World War I, Baltimore was undergoing dramatic
growth. 1 52 In 1918, the city annexed territory tripling its area. 153 Be-
tween 1920 and 1930, housing construction peaked at 6000 per year,
most of them in the new annex.1 5
4
During the 1920s, Negroes poured into Baltimore from the coun-
tryside and the black population increased by fifteen percent.1 55 Be-
tween 1920 and 1930, the city's overall population rose from
approximately 730,000 to approximately 805,000, while the non-white
population increased from approximately 108,000 to approximately
143,000. 156
The white middle-class led the exodus to the suburbs, leaving the
old city to the white native-born working class, first generation Euro-
pean immigrants, and the growing Negro population. 157 Black hous-
ing was limited in supply because of the de facto segregation.1 5 8 The
148. Committee on Segregation, in Howard Jackson Files, Baltimore City Archives
(1924).
149. Garrett Power, Public Service and Private Interests: A Chronicle of the Professional Life of
Philip B. Perlman, 4J.S. LEGAL HIST. 61, 62 (1995-1996).
150. Committee on Segregation, in Howard Jackson Files, Baltimore City Archives
(1924).
151. Power, supra note 117, at 318.
152. OLSoN, supra note 121, at 302.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 303.
155. Power, supra note 117, at 316.
156. The Political and Human Geography of Baltimore City: An Overview, 1729-1992, MARY-
LAND STATE ARCHIVES, DOCUMENTS FOR THE CLASSROOM (Maryland State Archives, Annapo-
lis, MD) Dec. 20, 1991, at 1; IRA DE A. REID, THE NEGRO COMMUNITY OF BALTIMORE 9
(1935).
157. OLSON, supra note 121, at 325.
158. Id. at 326.
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Illustration 2. Baltimore City and Suburbs adopted from Balti-
more Municipal Journal, July 15, 1919.
100,000 African Americans who lacked decent housing forced entry
into white neighborhoods. 5 9
White city-dwellers resisted the "black invasion" district by district,
neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block, and house by house.
News accounts from the 1920s are filled with stories of angry confron-
tations, broken windows and the other terror tactics employed by the
besieged white homeowners.1 6 ° But over the long term, a voluntary
multi-party conspiracy in restraint of sale of homes to blacks in white
neighborhoods was doomed to failure.
159. Neverdon-Morton, supra note 71, at 31.
160. Power, supra note 117, at 297.
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The economics are simple: "The temptation of members to cheat
is strong ... because the returns from cheating are substantial .... 161
White sellers willing to violate unwritten rules of segregation could sell
a house at a premium to black buyers.1 62 Speculators could multiply
this premium by "busting" a block at a time. 163
If a plan for defacto segregation was to have any long term success
it needed to be backed by the force of law. While the U.S. Supreme
Court had ruled in Buchanan v. Warley that residential racial segrega-
tion could not be imposed by public law, it had not foreclosed the
legal enforcement of private covenants requiring residential segrega-
tion.' 64 Racially restrictive covenants seemed to be the answer. It was
easy enough for suburban developers of new subdivisions to prospec-
tively impose restrictive covenants on the building lots they were creat-
ing. Ever since the decision in Tulk v. Moxhay in 1848, there had been
good precedent for the imposition of permanent restrictions on the
use of land. 6 ' Subdividers had long used such deed restrictive cove-
nants as a marketing device to guarantee lot purchasers a first-class
neighborhood. For example, the Roland Park Company touted a
"thousand acres of restricted land" where "[c]arefully designed pro-
tective covenants safeguard owners from encroachment of business,
and from other uses of property detrimental to the value and general
good of a residential section." '1 6 6
We have seen that years before, in 1893, the Roland Park Com-
pany had requested advice of counsel as to whether it could legally
insert a provision prohibiting ownership, use or occupancy by "per-
sons of African descent."' 6 7 When their lawyer opined that such provi-
sions would be illegal because they constituted an unreasonable
restraint on the free alienation of land, the Company backed off and
161. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 115 (1972).
162. Power, supra note 117, at 321.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (quoting the holding in Buchanan v.
Warley and its application to the Baltimore ordinance).
165. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1843) (holding that when a subsequent purchaser acquires
property with knowledge of a restrictive covenant, the purchaser is bound by the
covenant).
166. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUILDERS' EXCHANGES OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, BALTIMORE OF TODAY 96 (Baltimore, Md. 1916) (souvenir of the Fifth Annual
Convention of the National Association of Builders' Exchanges of the United States of
America).
167. Letter from law firm of Schmucker & Whitelock, to Edward H. Bouton, Gen. Mgr.,
Roland Park Co. (Oct. 5, 1892) (on file with Cornell University Libraries, Department and
Manuseries and University Archives, Roland Park Co. Papers, #2828, Box 205).
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concentrated on restricting the physical development of the lots
instead. 168
By 1910, however, Roland Park found itself in earnest competi-
tion with copycat Forest Park for recognition as Baltimore's premiere
suburb. Forest Park had copied the Roland Park covenants, but "im-
proved" upon them by adding a prohibition against Negro occupancy.
Roland Park met the competition head-on by adding its own racially
restrictive covenants. For example, the covenant for its Guilford plat
read as follows:
At no time shall the land included in said tract or any part
thereof or any building erected thereon be occupied by any
negro or person of negro extraction. This prohibition, how-
ever, is not intended to include the occupancy by a negro
domestic servant .... 169
Presumably, these covenants focused only on Negro "occupancy" and
not Negro "ownership" to protect them from legal challenge as unrea-
sonable restraints on alienation. Besides, white communities were dis-
tressed by invasion of Negro residents not absentee Negro owners.
During this era, other Baltimore suburban development compa-
nies were imposing similar racial restrictions.17 ° And one developer
went a step further. George Morris, who was a member of MayorJack-
son's Committee on Segregation when he created Ashburton in 1920,
undertook to make it the most "exclusive" subdivision in town with
the following restriction:
168. See supra notes 74-76 and supporting text (noting that the Roland Park Co. did not
use racial covenants as a result of the opinion letter). The Roland Park Company subdi-
vided its land over the years in a series of separate plats. Typically a master set of restric-
tions was prepared for each plat and uniformly imposed on all of the lots therein. Judge
Frank detailed these procedures in Wehr v. Roland Park, Cir. Ct. No. 2 Baltimore City, filed
September 8, 1922, 4 Baltimore City Reports 158 (1922) as follows:
The Roland Park Company of Baltimore City, was incorporated in 1891 and ac-
quired the property which it thereon proceeded to develop. In 1892, Plat No. 1,
involving 116 acres of land, was recorded, and the land was laid out in 427 lots. In
1901, Plat No. 2, affecting about 52 acres, was recorded, the land being divided
into 85 lots. In 1903, Plat No. 3, comprising 120 acres and subdivided into 192
lots, was recorded.... Plat No. 6, comprising 52 acres and subdivided into 132
lots, was filed in 1909; Plat No. 5, containing 67 acres, laid out in 201 lots was
recorded in 1911; Plat No. 4a, containing 11 acres and 32 lots was filed in 1915,
and the Plat of Guilford, containing 335 acres and 761 lots was filed in 1913.
Id.
169. Land Records of Baltimore City, Liber S.C.L. 4220, folio 321 (1924).
170. Homeland, Land Records of Baltimore City, Liber S.C.L. 4330, folio 435 (1924);
Forest Park, Land Records of Baltimore County, Liber W.P.C. 347, folio 31 (1909); Mt.
Washington, Land Records of Baltimore County, Liber W.P.C. 371, folio 472 (1911); Ash-
burton, Land Records of Baltimore City, Liber S.C.L. 4778, folio 460 (1927); West Forest
Park, Land Records of Baltimore City, Liber W.P.C. 4763, folio 209 (1927).
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[F] or the purpose of maintaining the property and the sur-
rounding property as a desirable high class residential sec-
tion... no owner of the land hereby conveyed shall have the
right to sell or rent the same without the written consent of
the grantor herein which have the right to pass upon the
character desirability and other qualifications of the proposed
purchaser or occupant of the property .... 171
Morris had retained the power unto himself to select the class, race,
religion, and ethnic background of Ashburton's residents.
Morris had gone a step too far. When his covenant was chal-
lenged in 1929, the Court of Appeals of Maryland struck it down be-
cause "[t]he existence of such discretionary control would be plainly
incompatible with the freedom of alienation ... 172 Perhaps the
lawyer for the Roland Park Company had been correct in his 1893
opinion that racial restrictions would likewise be void, but from a mar-
keting standpoint the suburban development companies had little to
lose. Because a covenant excluding Negroes appealed to their in-
tended white purchasers, they might as well include it, valid or void.
In preexisting neighborhoods, those undertaking to put in place
restrictive covenants barring Negroes faced what the economist has
called high transaction costs. Even where the bugbear of "Negro inva-
sion" had created a consensus in favor of the desirability of reciprocal
racially restrictive covenants, some property holders in the community
could take strategic advantage of the situation and refuse to sign on.
Holdouts would have both the advantage of the racial restrictions
binding their neighbors' houses while retaining the option of selling
out to African-American families at a premium, if and when the prof-
fered price was high enough. And during the negotiation stage, some
supporters of the covenants might be reluctant to sign because of a
concern that some of their neighbors might hold out.
Those seeking to impose uniform racial restriction in their old
Baltimore row house communities tried to overcome these obstacles
with community organization, peer pressure, and persuasion.1 73 By
May of 1925, eighteen neighborhood associations had formed the Al-
lied Civic and Protective Association of Baltimore with the intent of
working together to urge "property owners to sign agreements not to
171. Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 231, 144 A. 245 (1929) (emphasis
added).
172. Id. at 235, 144 A. at 247.
173. Power, supra note 117, at 315.
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dispose of their property to Negro purchasers."1 74 Participants agreed
that:
all possible publicity be given to anyone who sells a house in a white
neighborhood to a negro buyer in order to make a large profit or who
evicts white tenant in order to let his house to a number of negro
families at a greater rental.
175
When one attendee urged that violators of the "color line" be tarred
and feathered, others agreed.
176
The Allied Civic and Protective Association had some success in
"retrofitting" restrictive covenants on Baltimore's preexisting down-
town neighborhoods. The proponents claimed that racial covenants
were preventing the expansion of the black districts in both west and
east Baltimore. 177 In the white society district, for example, the head
of the Mt. Royal Association asserted that of the three thousand
properties in the area, twenty-eight hundred had been restricted.
178
III. MEADE v. DENNISTONE
The Home Protective Association was one of the community's
"improvement and protective associations" that fell under the aegis of
the Allied Civic and Protective Association. 79 Its boundaries encom-
passed a twenty-four square block neighborhood, "bounded on the
north and south by Twenty-fifth Streets and North Avenue and on the
east and west by Barclay Streets and Charles Streets."
18
When the houses in this area were first built in the 1890s, the
main streets, Charles, St. Paul, Calvert, Guilford, and Barclay, were
occupied exclusively by white residents."8 By the end of the first
World War (1917), several side streets and alleys, 221/2, and 23rd
Streets, had come to have a significant Negro population.
8 2 By 1927
or 1928, the 2300 block of Guilford had become "practically all
colored." 83
174. BALT. SUN, May 14, 1925, in "Baltimore-Zoning" Vertical File, Maryland Depart-
ment, Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore MD.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Neverdon-Morton, supra note 71, at 33.
178. Id.
179. Stenographic Transcript, at 27-28, Dennistone v. Berman, Circuit Court of Balti-
more City (Docket No. A 865-1936 (1937)) [hereinafter Stenographic Transcript].
180. Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 298, 196 A. 330, 331 (1938).
181. Stenographic Transcript, supra note 179, at 4-6.
182. Id. at 25-26.
183. Id. at 19-20.
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Illustration 3. Home Protection Association. Adapted from:
G.W. BROMLEY & Co., ATLAS OF THE CITY OF BALTIMORE 15 (1906).
Beginning in 1927 or 1928, Association members circulated an
agreement, and many owners of property mutually agreed that their
houses should not "at any time [be] occupied or used by any ne-
groes... except... that negroes ... may be employed as servants...
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and whilst so employed may live on the premises." '184 The promises
were said to "run with and bind the land" and were recorded in the
Land Records of Baltimore City.1 85
By no means did all of the property owners within the twenty-four
block area agree to the racial restrictions. In the 2200 block of Bar-
clay Street, for example, only fifteen of the twenty five properties were
restricted. 8' But the owners of No. 2227 Barclay had on November
14, 1927 "duly acknowledged and recorded," to exclude Negroes from
ownership or occupancy, and when No. 2227 was subsequently con-
veyed to Frank Berman who in 1936 contracted to sell the property to
Edmond Meade, a Negro, the issue was drawn and the case was
presented. 187
The plaintiff's complaint in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City
came as no surprise to the defendant, Edmond Meade. In 1934, the
NAACP appointed Charles Houston (the long-time Dean of Howard
Law School) as its special counsel and Houston embarked on a na-
tional legal strategy to attack racial discrimination with locally gener-
ated issues.188  Baltimore was to serve as a "legal laboratory" in
Houston's effort.'8 " The NAACP provoked the suit by Dennistone as
a test of the constitutionality of racially restrictive covenants.'90
Baltimore seemed an unlikely focal point for Charles Houston's
strategy. Although a Baltimore branch of the NAACP had been
founded to fight the city's residential segregation laws in 1912, by the
1930s it was largely inactive, with only 100 members. 9 1 But Houston
had a prottg6 already in residence. Thurgood Marshall, one of Dean
Houston's favorite students at Howard Law School, who graduated in
1933 and returned to his hometown to practice law.
1 92
Together Houston and Marshall undertook to constitutionally
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment the pervasive racial seg-
regation laws in Maryland and Baltimore. Although the broad import
of the clause guaranteeing all persons "equal protection of the laws"
184. Meade, 173 Md. at 297, 196 A. at 331.
185. Id.
186. Stenographic Transcript, supra note 179, at 14-16.
187. Meade, 173 Md. at 297-98, 196 A. at 331.
188. W. Edward Orser, Neither Separate Nor Equal: Foreshadowing Brown in Baltimore
County, 1935-1937, 92 MD. HIST. MAG. 5, 6-7 (1997).
189. Andor D. Skotnes, The Black Freedom Movement and Worker's Movement in Bal-
timore, 1930-1939, at 389 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on
file with Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick).
190. Id. at 396-97.
191. Id. at 389 (stating that in the mid-1930s the NAACP only had 100 members).
192. Orser, supra note 188, at 9.
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worked in their favor, two nineteenth-century precedents of the U.S.
Supreme Court crimped the Amendment's meaning. First, Plessy v.
Ferguson held that segregation, if "separate but equal," was good
enough to satisfy the requirements of equal protection,' 93 and second,
the Civil Rights Cases, which held that the Fourteenth Amendment
only forbade public discrimination and not private discrimination. 194
With the advice and consent of Charles Houston, Thurgood Mar-
shall first took on the inequality of the separate treatment of Negroes
in Maryland in the realm of education.'95 Marshall reluctantly ac-
cepted racial segregation so long as real equality was afforded in the
separate treatment of Negroes and argued cases on that question of
fact.19 6 He gained African-American Donald Gaines Murray's admis-
sion to the University of Maryland School of Law by showing that the
state failed to provide Murray with the equal opportunity of an
equivalent legal education elsewhere.197
Following this spectacular victory young Marshall launched an as-
sault on the inequality of Negro secondary education. In Williams v.
Zimmerman, 98 he challenged the failure of Baltimore County (a rural
subdivision surrounding Baltimore City) to provide any public high
schools for black teenagers.
The lawyer opposing Marshall had a familiar name, William L.
Marbury, Jr. Young Marbury had graduated from Harvard Law School
in 1924 and joined his father's law firm in 1935.199 The senior Mar-
bury had long established credentials as a segregationist. 200 He played
a leading role in efforts to disenfranchise blacks in the first decade of
the century; he drafted the ill-fated residential segregation ordinances
in the second decade; and he served on Mayor Howard Jackson's
Committee on Segregation in the 1920s. Marbury senior died in
1935, but his son carried on the family tradition of advocating racial
segregation.20 1
193. 163 U.S. 538, 550-51 (1896) (holding specifically that a Louisiana statute requiring
railways to provide separate but equal railway carriages did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment).
194. 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (holding that the constitution does not protect against
wrongful acts by individual unsupported by state laws).
195. Orser, supra note 188, at 9.
196. See id. (noting that in Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936), Marshall
argued that exclusion was the issue, not segregation).
197. Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 489, 182 A. 590, 594 (1936).
198. 172 Md. 563, 192 A. 353 (1937).
199. MAmBURY, supra note 105, at 75, 86.
200. Id. at 321.
201. Id.; see supra notes 132-133, 150 and accompanying text (noting Marbury's
activities).
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Marshall failed to gain the African-American Margaret Williams
entry into a white county high school. The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land found that Marshall failed to meet the burden of proving that
"equality of treatment [was] not obtainable separately. ' 20 2
Marshall and Houston reassessed their options and took no ap-
peal to the U.S. Supreme Court.2 °3 In 1936, Marshall left Baltimore
and joined Houston as an Assistant Special Counsel in the NAACP's
national office in New York.20 4 The NAACP refrained from bringing
any other school equalization case involving primary or secondary ed-
ucation in Maryland or elsewhere for ten years. 20 5 It was not until
1954 that Marshall would convince the high court that segregated
schools were "inherently unequal.
20 6
Marshall left behind a revitalized Baltimore Branch of the
NAACP, and the groundwork for a challenge to the public-private di-
chotomy as it limited constitutional protection of civil rights. The de-
cision in the Civil Rights Cases, that the Fourteenth Amendment only
protected against unconstitutional public actions,20 7 was an open invi-
tation to government agencies to achieve racial segregation by pro-
moting racial discrimination from behind the scenes through private
actors. Certainly that proved to be the case with respect to residential
segregation in Baltimore. When its segregation ordinances (public ac-
tions) were held unconstitutional in State v. Gurry,20 8 the Mayors Pres-
ton and Jackson had sponsored an informal plan for segregation in
which private racially restrictive covenants were the centerpiece.
W. A. C. Hughes, Jr. was Marshall's successor as counsel of the
Baltimore branch of the NAACP.20' Hughes, who had descended
from two historic Maryland African-American families, was a graduate
of Boston University School of Law.210 He had found the perfect test
case for challenging restrictive racial covenants when white neighbors
sought to enjoin Edmond Meade, an African American, from occupy-
ing the house on Barclay Street.211 Hughes masked the interest of the
202. Williams, 172 Md. at 567, 192 A. at 355.
203. Orser, supra note 188, at 22.
204. Id. at 21.
205. Id. at 22.
206. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
207. 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1893).
208. 121 Md. 534, 88 A. 546 (1913).
209. Obituary of William Alfred Carroll Hughes, Jr., Hughes, William A.C., 1905-1966, in
Maryland Vertical File, Baltimore Enoch Pratt Free Library.
210. Id.
211. Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 A. 330 (1938).
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NAACP by appearing as Meade's private attorney. The opposing
counsel representing the neighbors was William L. Marbury, Jr.2 12
Meade's defense presented Hughes with an extremely difficult
case. Housing was a most divisive issue; whites had a long tradition of
using violence to discourage blacks from moving into their neighbor-
hoods. 2 13 And a requirement of a "state action" had become firmly
ensconced in the Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 4 But
there remained the argument that racial restrictions constituted an
unreasonable restraint on alienation. 215 Moreover the political land-
scape was changing. In 1923, Democratic mayor Howard Jackson had
created a Committee on Segregation and charged it with the protec-
tion of white neighborhoods from Negro invasion. In 1936, during a
second tour of duty as a Democratic mayor, Jackson had become a
dues-paying member of the Baltimore branch of the NAACP.2 16 The
Democratic Party was seeking support from African-American voters.
Perhaps a Democratic judge would find a way to deny the injunction
and to permit Meade to reside at 2227 Barclay Street.
Hughes in Baltimore consulted with Thurgood Marshall at the
New York office of the NAACP as to the arguments to present on
Meade's behalf before Judge George A. Solter (a member of the Dem-
ocratic Party) in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.21 7 They mixed
together fifteenth-century formalism, Fourteenth Amendment juris-
prudence and twentieth century public policy. They contended that
the racially restrictive agreements did not apply to Meade because:
they did not "run with the land," they were unsupported by "privity of
estate," they were repugnant to the grant, they were unreasonable re-
straints on alienation, they violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and
they were contrary to public policy.218 Judge Solter rejected these de-
fenses out of hand and enjoined Meade and his family from "using or
occupying No. 2227 Barclay Street. '2 19
Meade's loss in the Circuit Court left the Baltimore branch of the
NAACP without funds and in debt to the National NAACP.2 20 Only a
reluctant financial concession by the national office permitted the
212. Id. at 296, 196 A. at 331.
213. Skotnes, supra note 189, at 396-97.
214. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926) (stating that the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments do not restrict individual private actions).
215. State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 549-50, 88 A. 546, 549 (1913).
216. Thompson, supra note 0, at 227.
217. Meade Transcript, supra note 1, at 10.
218. Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 299, 196 A. 330, 332 (1938).
219. Id. at 296-97, 196 A. at 331; Meade Transcript, supra note 1, at 22 (Decree).
220. Thompson, supra note 0, at 259-60.
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branch to finance the appeal of Meade's case to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland. 221 And the appeal was doomed to failure. Eight of the
nine judges on Maryland's highest court rejected Meade's defenses
one by one.222 Meade, as a purchaser with notice of contractual re-
strictions, was held equitably bound regardless of traditional limita-
tions on running covenants and the antiquated notions of privity and
repugnance.223 The constitutional inhibition in the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was considered to be the power
of the state and not the right of individuals to contract with respect to
their property. 224 The rules against restraints on alienation were only
intended to permit free conveyance of land, not to foreclose limita-
tions on use and occupancy. 225 And it was not viewed as within the
province of the court to eradicate racial prejudice. 226 Chief Judge
Carroll Bond, the lone dissenter, published no opinion.227 As the
court's reformer, he perhaps would have found the racial restrictions
void as against public policy.
IV. MEADE'S AFTERMATH
The Baltimore branch of the NAACP could not afford to appeal
the Meade case to the U.S. Supreme Court, and Houston and Marshall
in the National office presumably thought the time not yet ripe for a
high court attack on private racial discrimination in housing.228 Even
though a legal challenge was not forthcoming, over the long term,
contractual restrictions were doomed to fail. Migration and World
War II boomed Baltimore City's population close to the million mark
and the blacks' share grew from eighteen percent to twenty-four per-
cent. 229 Population growth ran far ahead of wartime construction.23 0
The growing black community, trapped by the plan for defacto segre-
gation, fought for more space "block by block" and year by year.231
The white majority resisted mightily and sometimes violently but they
221. Id. at 260.
222. Meade, 173 Md. at 309, 196 A. at 336.
223. Id. at 307, 196 A. at 335.
224. Id. at 302, 196 A. at 333.
225. Id. at 307, 196 A. at 335.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 309, 196 A. at 336.
228. Thompson, supra note 0, at 260.
229. In 1930, blacks constituted 143,000 of the city's 805,000 residents (18%). The Politi-
cal and Human Geography of Baltimore City: An Overview, 1729-1992, MARYLAND STATE
ARCHIVES: DOCUMENTS FOR THE CLASSROOM (Maryland State Archives, Annapolis, MD) Dec.
20, 1991, at 1. In 1950, blacks constituted 226,000 of the city's 950,000 residents (24%).
230. OLSON, supra note 121, at 371.
231. Power, supra note 117, at 322.
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lacked the economic will to contain the pressure for black housing.
Covenants or no covenants, white homeowners sold out to the "block-
busters" who resold or rented to blacks. 23 2
The wartime spirit and the transaction costs of private enforce-
ment discouraged white holdouts from enjoining Negro newcomers.
Once the war was over a suburban housing boom accelerated white
flight, leaving behind many houses formally restricted to white occu-
pancy only, now owned and occupied by African Americans.233
A. Afterlife of the Advocates
The war years proved to be a time of professional growth and
opportunity for the advocates involved in Meade v. Dennistone.
Meade's lawyer, W.A.C. Hughes, continued to serve as legal counsel
for the Baltimore branch of the NAACP.23 4 In 1939, he prevailed in a
federal district court decision equalizing salaries between white and
black public school teachers throughout Maryland. 235 He went on to
convince the Enoch Pratt Library and the City Welfare Department to
hire qualified blacks, and while serving on the State Commission of
Higher Education, he negotiated the transfer of Morgan College from
the Methodist church to the State of Maryland.23 6 A lifelong Republi-
can, he never followed most of his fellow African Americans who
switched to the Democratic Party.23 7
At the national level, Thurgood Marshall was also thriving. In
1938, he became legal director of the national NAACP.2 38 As such, he
was the master strategist of the NAACP's efforts to end racial segrega-
tion.213 9 His first efforts were circumscribed by the Supreme Court
precedents holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment only applied to public acts of discrimination, and
that "separate but equal" public facilities were good enough.240 Mak-
ing the best of the bad law, he traveled throughout the South winning
232. Id. at 321-22.
233. W. EDWARD ORSER, BLOCKBUSTING IN BALTIMORE: THE EDMONSON VILLAGE STORY 68
(1994).
234. Obituary of William Alfred Carroll Hughes, Jr., supra note 209.
235. Mills v. Lowndes, 26 F. Supp. 792 (D. Md. 1939).
236. Obituary of William Alfred Carroll Hughes, Jr., supra note 209.
237. Id.
238. Richard Lacayo, Marshall's Legacy, TIME, July 8, 1991, at 24.
239. Id.
240. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
17 (1883).
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ninety-five percent of his cases by proving that the separate public fa-
cilities were not in fact equal.24'
William L. Marbury Jr., the counsel who opposed Hughes and
Marshall in Meade v. Dennistone, also became a national figure. Mar-
bury left the advocacy of racial segregation behind to become a leader
of the Baltimore bar. During World War II, he went to Washington
where he served in the War Department.2 42 He described his role as
"Chief Counsel for the procurement or industrial side of the War De-
partment. ' '2 4 3 After the war, Marbury was awarded the national Medal
of Merit and was proposed as the next Solicitor General of the United
States, but he had competition. 244 As fate would have it his rival was
another Baltimore lawyer, Philip B. Perlman.245 Twenty years before,
Perlman, then City Solicitor of Baltimore, served on Mayor Jackson's
Committee on Segregation along with Marbury's father.
246
In 1946, William L. Marbury, Jr. returned to practice in the Balti-
more bar and resumed his public service as a chairman of a 1946 gu-
bernatorial commission charged with the reform of higher education
in Maryland.2 47 On the race issue, the Marbury Commission crafted a
compromise. Rather than integrating the public colleges and univer-
sities, the separate black public colleges were to be strengthened, and
out-of-state scholarships were to be provided for black graduate stu-
dents in subjects where "separate but equal" programs were not
provided. 48
V. CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE COURTS
The spirit of national unity and goodwill following World War II
made the time seem right for a movement improving the civil rights of
African Americans. NAACP Chief Counsel Thurgood Marshall, how-
ever, still faced two adverse nineteenth-century precedents. First, the
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to public acts
of discrimination, and not private acts of discrimination, was proving
to be a serious curtailment of the effectiveness of civil rights litiga-
tion.149 Public officials had found that by behind the scenes facilita-
tion of racial segregation by private actors they could discriminate
241. Lacayo, supra note 238, at 24.
242. MARBURY, supra note 105, at 150.
243. Id. at 171.
244. Id. at 251. The position of Solicitor General went to Phil Perlman. Id.
245. Id.
246. Power, supra note 149, at 62.
247. MARBURY, supra note 105, at 254.
248. Id. at 254-55.
249. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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with constitutional immunity-witness Meade v. Dennistone.2" ° Second,
still on the books was the precedent holding that "separate but equal"
state actions affecting the races satisfied the constitutional require-
ments of equal protection.2 5 1 Case by case challenges that the sepa-
rate treatment of African Americans was not in fact equal was time
consuming and costly. 252 These precedents needed to be overruled if
the civil rights movement was to be successful.
When NAACP chief counsel, Thurgood Marshall, had heard in
1947 that the two candidates for Solicitor General of the United States
were William L. Marbury, Jr. and Philip B. Perlman, he must have
been discouraged. The Solicitor General of the United States served
as the "Nation's Lawyer." One of the jobs of the office is to intervene
in the U.S. Supreme Court amicus curiae when private litigants are ad-
vancing private claims that also serve the national interest. Both Mar-
bury and Perlman had long-standing records as advocates for racial
segregation in Maryland. 253 Marshall could not have been optimistic
that he would have a "friend in court" when he challenged these ad-
verse precedents in the Supreme Court.
As things turned out, President Truman appointed Perlman
(rather than Marbury) as Solicitor General.2 54 Perlman had earned
the job as a Democratic loyalist. 255 In 1932, Perlman headed the
Maryland campaign for Franklin Delano Roosevelt and remained an
active supporter of Roosevelt in the next three campaigns.2 5 6
A. Shelley v. Kraemer
In 1947, Thurgood Marshall found a case he had been waiting a
decade for. The Court of Appeals of Maryland had decided in Meade
v. Dennistone that racial discrimination in housing did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment when based upon private covenant rather
than public action.2 57 The NAACP had foregone any appeal and its
tacit acceptance of this public-private dichotomy had proved a serious
curtailment on the effectiveness of civil rights litigation. Shelley v. Krae-
mer2 5 was the case to test it in the high court.
250. 173 Md. 295, 196 A. 330 (1938).
251. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
252. See Thompson, supra note 0, at 259 (noting the costs associated with trying just one
case).
253. Power, supra note 149, at 62.
254. Id. at 64.
255. Id. at 65.
256. Id. at 64.
257. Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 306-07, 196 A. 330, 335 (1938).
258. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Shelley presented the same facts and the same legal questions as
Meade v. Dennistone. Thirty of thirty-nine neighbors in a St. Louis
neighborhood had mutually agreed to restrict their property so that it
could only be used and occupied by those of the "Caucasian race,"
and the Missouri Supreme Court enforced the restriction.259 Marshall
argued on behalf of Shelley, a Negro purchaser of one of the re-
stricted parcels, that the covenants denied Shelley "equal protection
of the law" under the Fourteenth Amendment. 260 Not surprisingly,
the Mount Royal Protective Association-forever vigilant in efforts to
protect its Baltimore neighborhood from Negro invasion-filed a
brief as amicus curiae in support of the constitutionality of the restric-
tive covenants.261 But surprisingly, U.S. Solicitor General Philip Perl-
man intervened in support of Shelley, arguing that private restrictions
prohibiting the sale of houses to Negroes were not in the public
interest. 2
62
Philip Perlman had switched sides on the "race question. '26 3 In
1925, as City Solicitor of Baltimore, he had led the Mayor's Commit-
tee on Segregation in its efforts to exclude blacks from white neigh-
borhoods. 264 In 1948, as Solicitor General of the United States, he
argued to the Supreme Court that residential racial restrictions were
unconstitutional. 26 5 Perlman's conversion can be explained in terms
of party politics. In 1925, virtually all of Baltimore's black voters were
Republicans, and the Democratic Mayor Jackson had no sympathy for
their dearth of houses. But Roosevelt's New Deal had brought blacks
into the Democratic Party, and the Party's leadership now was intent
upon satisfying some of their demands. Perlman's change of mind
was symptomatic of a metamorphosis in the body politic-a move-
ment away from discrimination and towards racial equality had
begun.2 6
6
The assumption that racially restrictive covenants involved only
private discrimination and not public discrimination was vulnerable to
constitutional challenge. The institution of private property is a public
institution. The Anglo-American property system is an outgrowth of
the feudal system whereby the King claimed title to all land as his
public domain. Over the ensuing one thousand years, the English
259. Id. at 5, 6.
260. Id. at 7-8.
261. Id. at 4.
262. Power, supra note 149, at 65.
263. Id. at 67.
264. Id. at 62.
265. Id. at 65.
266. Id. at 66-67.
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Crown and sovereign states have transferred parcels to the private
owners subject to a continuing public oversight pursuant to which the
legislatures and the courts have shaped and reshaped the perquisites
of private ownership. Special public attention has been paid to main-
tenance of free and open land markets. State legislatures, city coun-
cils, and the courts have decided when contractual restraints on
alienation violate public policy and when they do not. Hence, the
decision whether or not to enforce restrictive covenants is a discre-
tionary public choice and therefore ought to be subjected to Four-
teenth Amendment scrutiny.2 6 7 The Supreme Court so held in Shelley
v. Kraemer.268
B. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
NAACP Chief Counsel Thurgood Marshall faced another major
obstacle in his efforts to desegregate American society. Still on the
books was Plessy v. Ferguson, a nineteenth-century precedent holding
that "separate but equal" state actions affecting the races satisfied the
constitutional requirements of equal protection.269 Marshall had trav-
eled the South throughout the 1930s and 1940s winning scores of
cases with the proof that the separate treatment of African Americans
was not in fact equal.2 7' Notwithstanding these efforts, institutional-
ized segregation continued to have the force of law, the most striking
example being the racially segregated school systems in the border
and southern states.
In the aftermath of World War II, America's progressive white
leaders embraced equal treatment of the races, but clung to the desir-
ability of segregation. For example, Philip Perlman had been trans-
formed by his argument in Shelley v. Kraemer.2 71 When national civil
rights leaders called to express their profound gratitude he became
committed to the civil rights struggle.2 7' But old prejudices die hard.
According to the recollection of a colleague, Solicitor General Perl-
man remained opposed to the integration of public primary and sec-
ondary schools, thinking the racial mixing of black children and white
children to be contrary to the general welfare.273
267. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that by enforcing restrictive cove-
nants, states violated rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
268. Id.
269. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896).
270. Lacayo, supra note 238, at 24.
271. Power, supra note 149, at 65.
272. Id.
273. Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter and Civil Rights Litiga-
tion, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARv. L. REv. 817, 825 (1987).
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Perlman resigned as Solicitor General of the United States in
1952.274 Ironically, his resignation may have further contributed to
the progress of the civil rights movement. Thurgood Marshall
brought a test case to challenge the constitutionality of segregated
public schools in 1953. Together Marshall and Attorney General Tom
Clark convinced the Supreme Court that separate school facilities
were inherently unequal in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of
Education275 and the second impediment to effective civil rights litiga-
tion tumbled.
CONCLUSION
The case of Meade v. Dennistone arose in an era when courts and
commentators were reconsidering "the nature of the judicial pro-
cess." 27 6 When Benjamin Cardozo addressed the topic at Yale Law
School in 1921, he opined that the guarantees and prohibitions of
constitutions and statutes, and the influences of precedents, customs,
politics, and sociology all had a role to play when courts consider the
validity of legally imposed restraints or prohibitions.
277
This certainly seems to have been the case in Meade when the
Court of Appeals of Maryland considered the validity of a prohibition
barring Negro occupancy of a dwelling. The great generalities of the
constitutional guarantee of "equal protection of the law," and the pro-
hibition against deprivation of "property without due process of law"
called for a look to precedents and customs. The nineteenth-century
cases in the U.S. Supreme Court had held that "separate but equal"
satisfied the guarantees of equal protection and that due process of
the law was unconcerned with private deprivations of property.
278 Ra-
cial residential segregation in housing continued to be the custom
and to have widespread political support among the ruling white ma-
jorities. Moreover, a rationalization for racial segregation was in
vogue amongst the intelligentsia. Disciples of English philosopher
Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinism posited that Negroes were eugen-
274. Power, supra note 149, at 65.
275. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
276. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CAwozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); JE-
ROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-
The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431 (1930) (discussing core concepts of law instead of
giving law a specific definition); Ezra Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L.
REv. 697 (1931) (discussing the characteristics of realist jurisprudence).
277. CAItozo, supra note 276, at 14, 19, 31, 43.
278. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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ically inferior.279 Turn-of-the century census data supported the view
that Negroes were a dying race: blacks showed a higher mortality rate
and lower birth rate than whites. 2 ° Because "blacks were degenerat-
ing with no future . . . [the] prognosis pointed . . . to the need to
segregate or quarantine" them until they disappeared. 21  Hence
precedents, customs, politics, and sociology all conjoined to support
the Court of Appeals' decision in 1938.
Some things changed. Rather than dying off, Baltimore's black
population inexorably grew from 143,000 in 1930, to 166,000 in 1940,
to 226,000 in 1950.282 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New
Deal during these years brought Negroes into the Democratic Party,
and its leaders pledged to meet some of their demands. The valiant
service of African Americans in World War II led to greater accept-
ance of blacks by the white community. Herbert Spencer's Social Dar-
winism fell into intellectual disrepute. All this may have led the
United States Supreme Court to rethink its precedent to foreclose ju-
dicial enforcement of private racial discrimination and to reject the
proposition that "separate" was "equal." NAACP General Counsel
Marshall was at last free to sue Jim Crow out of Baltimore, Maryland,
and the Nation with the Fourteenth Amendment.
But some things stayed the same. The custom of racial segrega-
tion remained deeply engrained in the national culture. And
Thurgood Marshall was destined to spend the rest of his professional
life (first as an advocate and later as a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court) challenging the vestiges of discrimination in hous-
ing, schools, and other aspects of American life.
279. Benno Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive
Era: Part 1: The Hayday ofJim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 444, 453 (1982).
280. Id.
281. GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON
AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY 1817-1914, at 255 (1971).
282. The Political and Human Geography of Baltimore City: An Overview, 1729-1992, MARY_
LAND STATE ARCHIVES: DOCUMENTS FOR THE CLASSROOM (Maryland State Archives, Annapo-
lis, MD), Dec. 20, 1991, at 1.
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